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I.

APPROACHES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS ....................

INTRODUCTION

After reading and listening to Professor Cooter's article and presentation,' I am tempted to begin and end my commentary with a simple statement: It's an empirical question, isn't it? But determining
2
whether the "market for norms" eventually produces efficient norms
requires defining what "efficiency" means. This, in turn, may mean
arriving at a fair (or is it efficient?) process for determining who will
decide the relevant definition of efficiency in a context in which
norms and seemingly "efficient" solutions to problems may be easily
confused. Rather than take the unconventional route (for law professors, that is), I will take the more conventional route of simply addressing a few of the points in Professor Cooter's careful and thoughtprovoking article.
t Jeffrey L. Harrison is the Chesterfield Smith Professor of Law at the University of
Florida Law School.
1 Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947 (1997)
[hereinafter Cooter, Normative Failure);see also Robert Cooter, DecentralizedLaw for a Complex Economy: The StructuralApproach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. Rxv.
1643 (1996) (arguing that a lawmaker's role is to find community norms, apply a structural
test to those norms, and enforce the norms that pass the test); Robert Cooter, The Theory of
Market Modernization of Law, 16 INT'L RaV. L. & ECON. 141 (1996) (arguing that economic
specialization requires the decentralization of business law, which in turn consists of the
evolution of norms in communities and the internalization of those norms by the communities' members).
2

See Cooter, Normative Failure,supra note 1, at 948-49, 978-79.
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My comments begin with some general observations about how
my approach to law and economics differs from Professor Cooter's. I
then relate a story-I think relevant-about my previous encounter
with Professor Cooter. I then mention a couple of important issues
that I have elected not to address and discuss seven others in some
depth.
I
APPROACHES TO LAW AND ECONOMICS

As I read Professor Cooter's article, it occurred to me that, at least
in the context of the issue of norms and perhaps even in law and
economics generally, we approach things differently. This difference
may account for the points I make later. On a very general basis, I
think a great deal of conventional law and economics scholarship underestimates the importance of the distributive issue that must be resolved before wealth or utility increasing change can take place. In
this regard, I find myself squarely in agreement with Paul Samuelson's
view that "rational self-interest... does not necessitate that there will
emerge .

.

. a Pareto-optimal solution that maximizes ...

profits, in

advance of and without regard to how that maximized profit is to be divided
up."3 In effect, there is an important distributive issue that must be
successfully addressed before efficiency outcomes are achieved. 4 Second, my sense is that a great number of what we call norms arise as a
result of efforts to alter distributive outcomes. They evolve to enhance
the position of one group relative to that of others. 5 Most likely,
norms are predominantly important in relatively small groups with homogeneous interests and may or may not warrant much attention by
the state. That is not to say that efficiency is not a side effect or that
efficiency and distributive issues are not intertwined. It may be just a
matter of a difference in emphasis, but I think it is an important
difference.

3 Paul A. Samuelson, The Monoolistic CompetitionRevolution, in MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITON THEORY. STUDIES IN IMPACr 105 (Robert E. Kuenne eds., 1967), reprinted in THE
COLLECTED SCIENTIFIC PAPERS OF PAUL A. SAMUELSON 18, 35 (Robert C. Merton ed., 1972).
4 See generallyJeffrey L. Harrison, Trends and Traces: A PreliminaryEvaluation of Economic Analysis in ContractLaw, 1988 ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 73, 96-98 (discussing the equitable distribution of surplus as a barrier to efficient breach in the contexts of specific
performance and liquidated damages clauses); Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game, J. EcoN. PERSP., Fall 1988, at 195 (discussing behavioral empirical results which
cannot "be explained by assuming that agents have stable, well-defined preferences and
make rational choices consistent with those preferences").
5 See discussion infra Part III.D.
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II
PROFESSOR COOTER AND THE

FOOTNOTE

The story I want to tell suggests why articles like Professor
Cooter's are important and also tells us how far law and economics
has progressed. My path crossed Professor Cooter's once before,
although I feel certain he has no recollection of it. In the mid-1980s, I
was writing an article on the behavioral assumptions of those writing
in the field of law and economics.6 My purpose was to question
whether the standard assumptions of rational self-interested behavior
could make the transition from what I termed the relatively impersonal markets or norm-neutral markets of standard economics to the
markets about which law and economics is largely concerned-those
markets that operate in the shadow of vague notions of right and
7
wrong.
I concluded that most people then writing about law and economics had adopted a behavioral assumption that equated the moral
development and behavior of adults with that of children.8 I did this
by comparing Kohlberg's stages of moral development 9 with the assumptions made by those writing in the field.' 0 As one would expect,
the basic assumption was that all people operated at the bottom end
of the developmental process." In other words, they acted in accordance with a narrow concept of self interest 12 in which short-run per3
sonal costs and benefits were the only relevant factors.'
Somehow, when discussing my project, a friend told me about
Professor Cooter's article Prices and Sanctions'4 that was still in draft
form, although accepted for publication by the ColumbiaLaw Review. I
called Professor Cooter and he sent me a draft copy. I searched
through it and discovered what I was looking for. In the text near the
beginning of the piece, Professor Cooter noted that he was assuming
that people were "rationally self-interested" and added that this would
exclude "[s] omeone who acts from duty and obeys the law out of re6 Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309 (1986).
7 Id. at 1309-14.
8 Id. at 1324.
9 Lawrence Kohlberg, Moral Stages and Moralization, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 31, 34-35 tbl.2.1 (Thomas Licona ed., 1976).
10 Harrison, supra note 6, at 1314-25.
11 See id. at 1321-22.
12 See Kohlberg, supra note 9, at 31-34.
13 See generallyAmartya K. Sen, Rational Fools:A Critique of the BehavioralFoundationsof
Economic Theoy, 6 PHIL. & PUB. Arr. 317 (1977) (examining problems arising from economic theory's assumption that actors are motivated only by self-interest). See also AMARivA
K. SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992) (discussing the different "capacities of people to
further their interests").
14 Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984).
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spect." I wrote my article, making my Kohlberg point. Before I sent it
out, Professor Cooter's article had been published and I sent my research assistant to find the page number for his qualifying language.
The research assistant reported that he could not find it. I then went
to the library myself and searched for the language. Finally, I found
it-in a footnote.' 5 Of course, I have no idea how the decision was
made to reduce this seemingly important information to footnote status, but I am still struck by the possible image of a not economically
sophisticated, but otherwise thoughtful, third-year law student thinking, "Is Professor Cooter really saying right in the text that all of these
6
pages may be about people that do not exist?"'
Now, it seems that even traditional law and economics scholars
have begun to try to account for actual (as opposed to hypothetical)
people.' 7 "Actual people" are people who are able to act in ways that
do not fit the confines of the narrow self-interest assumption 18 and
who are subject to cognitive distortions, 19 preference reversals, 20 relative preferences, 2 ' and relative deprivation.2 2 Moreover, they are people who not only shape laws and norms but whose tastes and
23
preferences are shaped by norms and laws.
15
See id at 1527 n.9. The footnote distinguishes "[slomeone who acts from duty and
obeys the law out of respect" from the "rationally self-interested" actor upon whom the
article's analysis is based. See id. at 1527 & n.9.
16 According to Richard Thaler, "there aren't many human beings populating the
world of economic models." RICHARD H. TIHIAR, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC

LIxFE 3 (1992).

17 For a recent effort, see Jeffrey L. Harrison, PiercingPareto Superiority: Real People and
the Obligations of Legal Theory, 39 ARrz. L. REv. 1 (1997).
18 Altruism, interdependent utility functions, and principled actions are typically unaccounted for in the traditional analysis. See Harrison, supra note 6, at 1320-40. Also missing is the view of law as an endogenous factor. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality,
Contract, and Unconscionability, 35 WM. & MARY" L. REv. 445, 448 (1994).
19 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with PrivatePreferences, 53 U. CHI. L. Rxv.
1129, 1166-69 (1986) (justifying government intervention in a system of private consumption choices when those choices are based on cognitive distortions).
20 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framingof Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 Sci. 453 (1981); see also JEF E L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NtrrSHELL 38-41 (1995) (discussing situations in which choices are not consistent with preferences). An excellent collection of readings about behavioral "anomalies" is contained in
THALER, supra note 16.

21 See Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences,102 YALE LJ. 1 (1992) (discussing people's desire to improve their position relative to others, and the implications of that phenomenon on economic analysis of individual choice).
22 See Harrison, supra note 18, at 460-62. For a general discussion of relative deprivation theory, see Joanne Martin, Relative Deprivation:A Theory ofDistributiveInjusticefor an Era
of Shrinking Resources, 3 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 53 (1981).
23 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the CriminalLaw as a PreferenceShaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1; Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory and
Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. GAI. L. REv. 669 (1979) (attacking the Coase Theorem by
arguing that legal rules change consumer demand behavior); Martin, supra note 22 (arguing that law, and particularly unconscionability doctrine, can serve as a preference-shaping
vehicle to alter expectations and one's sense of entitlement).

984

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:980

All of this means that efforts like Professor Cooter's are important
steps in the right direction of finding the proper place of economics
in a comprehensive legal theory. However, there are many problems.
There remains a fundamental disconnection between economics and
law. In fact, my view is that economics least complements law at precisely the point where law is weakest as a discipline. 24 Furthermore,
there is a discomforting connection between efficiency and norms
that may mean that it is not that useful to view them separately. Finally, it is not at all clear what the state or policymakers learn from
this joining of law and economics. My sense of these connections and
disconnections will be evident throughout my remarks.
III
SPECIFICS

As noted above, I have seven specific points to make about Professor Cooter's Article. For the most part, these are areas that I think
deserve further attention as economics continues to account for the
behavior of "real people." First, however, I want to note a couple of
points that might be interesting to explore, but are not addressed
here. One is the question of how typical market imperfections impact
the market for norms.2 5 Another is the existence of similarities between Professor Cooter's theory and earlier efforts to explain the
26
evolution of the common law as a product of economic inevitability.
A.

Competition and the Context

Professor Cooter writes, "In an environment of open competition, business practices tend to evolve rapidly towards efficiency,
which benefits the nation."27 This is a short sentence in length, but a
very big sentence in terms of its importance. In fact, each of its components-"open competition," "efficiency," and "the nation" each deserve and have received generations of discussion. I can only touch on
each one here.
First, I want to question the relationship between "open competition" and the formation of efficient norms. I must admit that I do not
24
See generally Harrison, supra note 17 (noting that economics is "woefully inadequate" at providing guidance to a state involved in wealth and resource redistributions).
25 See Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1749-53
(1996) (arguing that community norms will not be fully efficient because of market imperfections); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697,
1711-25 (1996) (discussing why inefficient norms might exist within private groups).
26
See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Common Law Processand the Selection ofEfficient Rules, 6
J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977) (finding that the common law process overcomes judicial discredon); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977) (describing how the behavior of litigants leads to the efficiency of legal decisions).
27
Cooter, Normative Failure,supra note 1, at 948.
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know exactly what open competition means, and when it is expressed
that way by an economist who is used to specifying exactly what competitive conditions are assumed to exist, I get even more uncomfortable. Of course, I suppose we could simply work backwards, wait for
efficient norms to evolve, and then conclude that whatever those competitive conditions were, they were "open" enough. But then again,
we would have to decide how to decide when they had evolved.
More seriously, as I understand it, Professor Cooter is actually
28
describing two markets at work, each creating different outputs -

one being norms and the other being more traditional output-that
are superimposed on the same community at the same time. Thus, if
the open market condition in the conventional market is not met,
Professor Cooter suggests that "harmful business norms" like "collusive practices" can evolve and lead to "monopolistic cartels." 29 In
short, open competition leads to "good" or efficient norms and lessthan-open competition can lead to bad or inefficient norms.
It seems to me that markets might work quite differently. It may
be that the possibility of beneficial evolution falls victim to the open
competition requirement. For example, the notion of being willing
and able to enforce a norm in the market for norms for a sufficiently
long enough time for it to take hold, and for others to internalize it or
be aware of the punitive measures that may follow if they do not, suggests that the market cannot be too open. This process is similar to an
investment in a public good. Real openness means that the temptation to "free ride" would be quite powerful and that the "public good,"
in the form of a norm, would be less likely to develop. On the other
hand, if one or a few firms have the ability to try out norms and experiment in hopes of solving some community-wide prisoners' dilemma, I
am not sure they would direct those energies toward improving the lot
of the community as a whole.
I agree with Professor Cooter that if the state takes some "norms"
off the table, it will indirectly force firms and individuals to adapt and
develop less harmful norms. This is much like hoping my children
will read books when I tell them that they may not watch television.
But here is where the crucial question arises for Professor Cooter's
thesis. Do my children read books because they like books or because
the television is unavailable? I would say the first instance is like the
formation of a norm, in that my constant supervision will not be required. The second, however, is not a norm at all, but merely is regulation as we have always known it. I am simply not sure that the
28
See Katz, supra note 25 (discussing law and economics'commentators' focus on comparing the efficiency of private systems of rules with that of publicly promulgated
regulations).
29 Cooter, Normative Failure supra note 1, at 948.
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"automatic pilot" outcome that Professor Cooter seems to be suggesting is in the cards. The problem, as I see it, is that there is no
necessary or logical connection between competitive conditions of any
kind and the process of internalization that Professor Cooter treats as
essential.
B.

Context and Efficiency

In that broad and important statement that I quoted above, Professor Cooter used the term "efficiency." For a couple of reasons, I am
not sure I understand the relationship between norms and efficiency.
It may be as simple as just getting the terms straight. For example,
take one of the standard definitions of efficiency as wealth or utility
maximization, or achieving a Pareto optimal state.30 As soon as a social norm develops, or becomes, as Professor Cooter calls it, an "effective consensus obligation," 3' it already is efficient, or has a
tremendous head start toward earning that label. In other words, if I
internalize a certain type of behavior as proper, then I must attribute
some value or utility to it. If others and I attribute sufficient value or
utility to that behavior, then its adoption becomes efficient. The question then is not whether norms that evolve are efficient-for if they
are uniformly accepted and internalized, it seems that they are already
on their way to being efficient. This may mean that the question of
whether a norm is efficient is not a very meaningful one, and that, in
order to assess social norms, one must rely on some other measure.
For example, a norm could develop among a fairly large group of
employees that two weeks of paid vacation is the standard amount of
vacation for salaried employees. Suppose further that, as a general
policy matter, the salaried employees' employers are quite happy with
this vacation policy. Is it an efficient policy? In a sense it would seem
to be. Indeed, there may be a consensus view that it is fair. Employers
who offer less are "disciplined," (by, for example, uncooperative behavior) and employees who demand more are singled out as troublemakers. In one sense, the outcome (if nothing else changes) is one
that is Pareto optimal.
However, it is important to examine what this efficiency may be
dependent upon. Perhaps these employees are generally happy with
what they have because they know of no other workers with more vacation time.3 2 Perhaps they are the children of depression-era survivors
30 A Pareto optimal state is one in which it is impossible to make one person better off
without making another person worse off. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN,LAW AND
ECONOMICS 12 (2d ed. 1997).

31

Cooter, Normative Failure, supra note 1, at 954.
In other words, they have not developed a sense of relative deprivation. For a general discussion of relative deprivation theory, see Martin, supra note 22.
32
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and are just happy to have jobs. Finally, maybe they regard other employees who express a desire for more vacation as trouble-makers.
This may stem from an internalized belief, sponsored by employers,
that employers and employees are all one big happy family. What one
accepts as right, satisfactory, or even "effective consensus obligation" is
learned, just as tastes, preferences, and the components of efficiency
are also learned. Moreover, in both cases, the factors doing the teaching can be the same. Obviously, if norms are a product of socialization (as are the practices or outcomes individuals tend to value), there
is a tautology at work. In fact, it is the same kind of relationship one
finds in other areas of law and economics-whether caused by the
endowment effect, wealth effects, framing problems, or cognitive dis33
tortions, the status quo keeps turning out what is efficient.
C. Efficient Norms and Utilitarian Concerns
The fact that "efficiency" is a function of socialization raises the
issue of whether there is anything morally attractive about Professor
Cooter's suggestions. This issue is also at the heart of a problem encountered by all utilitarian-based philosophies: What is the relevant
community? For example, Professor Cooter writes about business
norms that will enhance efficiency and benefit the "nation. '34 At
other times, he writes about communities. 35 As I read this, I began to
wonder how community is specified. This is the standard dilemma for
all utilitarian standards, and to a lesser extent, for some efficiencybased standards. 36 Just how broad is the community? Does it include
manufacturers of similar products? All manufacturers? Manufacturers and workers? All workers? Child laborers in less-developed countries toiling away on our brand name sneakers? If it includes all of
these groups, then the theory is not very useful. f it does not include
all of these groups, and efficiency is as contingent as I think it is, then
I begin to worry about notions of enforcement and punishment in the
interest of promoting conformity of individuals when those individuals veer from the social norm. I do not find anything in Professor
Cooter's reasoning telling me that enforcers are morally superior to
appropriators.
33 I will return to the contingent nature of norms and efficiency in the context of the
ability to shape norms. See infra Part III.F.
34
Cooter, Normative Failure supra note 1, at 948.
35 Id. at 955.
36 See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 51-54 (1981) (identifying
boundary concerns of utilitarianism); R. George Wright, FederalImmigration Law and the
Casefor Open Entry, 27 Loy. LA L. REv. 1265, 1296-97 (1994) (discussing the dilemma in

the context of immigration border policy).

988
D.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:980

Social Norms and Distributive Interests

As noted earlier, my sense is that social norms are more about
distributive matters than about efficiency. For example, take something simple such as telling the truth in the context of a commercial
relationship. Telling the truth, I think, is something we all could
agree is generally consistent with efficiency. It lowers all kinds of costs
for the community. But why would I decide to start telling the truth?
It may be that I want the business of people who want to avoid being
taken advantage of. In other words, I empathize with their distributive interests. And, why would I avoid those who have a reputation for
being untruthful? It must be because I want to avoid being taken advantage of myself. However, as soon as we shift from efficiency to the
notions of advantage-taking and adopt strategies to assure that one is
fairly treated, we are talking at least in part about distributive issues.
This is critically important when considering social norms or
group norms. After all, norms do not exist as free-floating impulses.
Adherence to a norm presumes that there is some kind of group or
community objective. Put differently, what happens when I act selflessly? Generally, it means that I am attempting to benefit my group.
Almost by definition, if the effort is to benefit one community, it may
very well work to the disadvantage of other communities, either directly or by neglect. Examples of norms that are explainable by reference to group objectives are common. For example, the
internalization of the welfare of one group instead of another may
explain the decision to vote. 37 Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why
people do vote. Similarly, strikes by members of labor unions require
an internalization explanation. 38 In an even more exotic sense, "self39
ish gene" theories also have very definite objects of internalization.
Let me make this point in another way. It is important to remember that the harmful norms that would develop in the absence of competition are, in Professor Cooter's view, those that would result in
benefits for those with economic power. 40 Professor Cooter also
writes, "[a] n effective norm changes behavior by increasing the level
of obedience." 4 1 The change is dependent on the level of "internalization." By this, he means that individuals are able to escape narrow
self-interest and act for the benefit of the group. Moreover, as I un37

See HowARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM, AND RATIONALITY. A THEORY OF SO-

CIAL CHOICE 82-95 (1982).
38
See, e.g., BERNARD KARSH, DIARY OF A STRIKE

129-30 (1958); ROSA

LUXEMBURG, THE

MASS STRIKE: THE POLITICAL PARTY AND THE TRADE UNIONS 3-92 (Harper & Row 1971)
(1906) (describing the mass strike as a proletarian weapon in the anti-capitalist
movement).
39
See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 2 (1976).

40
41

Cooter, Normative Failure, supranote 1, at 948; text accompanying note 29.
Cooter, Normative Failure, supra note 1, at 955.
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derstand it, we are not talking about learning to play some global version of the Prisoners' Dilemma game that involves concealing one's
self-interest in order to reap greater benefits than if one acted in an
obviously self-interested manner.4 2 In short, Cooter argues that not
all people are free riders all the time. Although I agree with this, Professor Cooter's article fails to answer the question why the norms that
emerge once one has overcome the shackles of self-interest should be
related to efficiency in any form. 43 It strikes me that what really happens is that the "self' in self-interest is simply enlarged.
This is not to say that group selfishness cannot result in efficiency.
Let us suppose that a norm arises within a group of competing suppliers that they will not say disparaging things-truthful or untruthfulabout the products of their competitors. I think this is a norm that
could evolve much as Professor Cooter has suggested. This is a norm
that is most likely to increase that portion of exchange-created gains
that manufacturers keep. Unless the relevant "nation" consists of
these products only, this norm is not efficient. I do not think that is
what Professor Cooter means by a nation.
What this means is that the norms that sellers adopt will not develop into anything other than distribution-enhancing norms, unless
buyers, equally conscious of what is in the interest of maximizing welfare for their nation, adopt a norm of not dealing with sellers who
refuse to engage in product comparisons. These norms clash in the
market and a potential outcome is that producers, whom we can suppose are the best providers of this information, start providing information about the comparative qualities of their products. This means
that buyers have won one of the battles in the distributive war. Further, there is also the likelihood that this will enhance efficiency in the
nation of producers and buyers of this particular item.
I think that this interpretation is different from what Professor
Cooter has in mind. First, and I will turn to this below, I do not see
anything like internalization. Instead, I see brute market power
against market power, with buyers evidently being able to punish sellers more than sellers are able or willing to endure.

42 See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (discussing
cooperation theory as it emerged from the Prisoners' Dilemma strategy known as "tit-for-

tat").

43 I must admit that I also missed the mystery knockout punch thrown by Muhanmuad
Ali to floor Sonny Liston in their second fight. I have seen that event in slow motion
hundreds of times and I still have not seen the punch. See, e.g., Boxing's GreatestKnockouts
(HBO television broadcast, Dec. 15, 1987) (replaying the 1965 rematch between then-Cas-

sius Clay and Sonny Liston).
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Internalization and Punishment

To this point, I have more or less viewed Professor Cooter's
model from the outside in the sense that I have questioned what terms
like "community" and "efficiency" mean. Now, I want to step inside
the system to explore the relationships between internalization, punishment, and social norms. Some of what I am going to say may be
covered by defining social norms as "effective consensus obligation."
If so, then my comments go to the issue of just how powerful these
social norms are likely to be. I think Professor Cooter may overestimate the likelihood of their development.
According to Professor Cooter, internalization of social norms is
crucial to their effectiveness. 44 He also says that "[a] person who internalizes a norm may punish people who violate it."45 In addition,

the willingness to punish determines the level of conformity. 46 However, my sense is that the difficulty of moving from internalization to
punishment is understated. It is more like a norm on top of a norm,
or a norm that is dependent on a principle. For example, I may internalize a belief about what is appropriate behavior, and this may lead
to self-restraint. I may simply be motivated to observe the norm to
avoid the feeling of guilt that I feel when I violate it. To then move to
the level of deciding that I will punish or have the right or obligation
to punish others who violate the norm, is quite a different analysis. At
that level, I have to become an instrument of the norm. I am not sure
that avoidance of guilt is what motivates me to do this. For that to be
my motivation, I must first decide that the actions of others are somehow my responsibility and that I have acted improperly if I do not
interfere with them.
Perhaps this point can be made by noting that Professor Cooter is
writing about four categories of people. First, there are, of course,
appropriators-people about whom laws are made and norms directed. Next, there are free riders who are perfectly delighted to have
others absorb the costs of controlling the appropriators. Third, there
are those who feel guilty about violating the norm, but, perhaps as a
matter of principle and not as a matter of conventional cost-benefit
analysis, will not interfere with others. To repeat one of Professor
44
Cooter, Normative Failure, supra note 1, at 955. There is a wonderful telling and
humorous passage in the text in which Professor Cooter seems to be trying to teach economists what internalization can mean. "[E] conomists... can understand internalization as
raising the subjective cost of violating an obligation." Id. at 956. I am sure the humor is
unintentional, but the passage evokes images of economists looking with disbelief as they
attempt to grasp the concept of internalization.
45 Id. at 962. Professor Cooter uses a table to illustrate the relationship between enforcement and its cost, meaning that even those who internalize, evidently engage in some
cost-benefit analysis. Id. at 957.

46

See id. at 962.
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Cooter's examples, while they would not violate a smoking ban, they
would not interfere with someone who does. Fourth, there are the
punishers, who, as Professor Cooter points out, are not at all uniform
in their willingness to punish.
To me, this last group is critical. They are the ones who must
decide to provide a public good. There may be, however, a big gap
between the number of people who favor the norm and those willing
to actually punish others in order to achieve it. In fact, if put to a vote,
three of the four groups would vote in favor of enacting a law that
would reflect the norm. On the other hand, the "market for norms"
would indicate much weaker support.
This may raise the question of why one group would vote to impose restrictions on others if members of the group were unwilling to
punish violators. The answer is probably not that it is simply less expensive. The answer may simply be their preference for expressing
values at the polls, as well as a sense that while they individually have
no right to punish others, the collective does have that right.
F.

The State as a Source of Preferences

As I noted above, from my point of view, norms and efficiency are
too intertwined to be treated separately in a meaningful manner.
They both are the products of the same socializing factors. It is important to add one more element to my analysis-law is itself a socializing
agent.4 7 This is something that economists prefer to keep out of their
analysis. In most models, individuals come into a context of stimuli
(the most obvious one being price) with a given set of exogenously
determined tastes and preferences. They then react to those stimuli
without changing their preferences. This paradigm, however, understates the power of law. It seems possible, even likely, that law has the
power to alter the preferences themselves.
Professor Cooter accounts for the impact of law in a way with
which I agree, but not in the way I have described it. In Professor
Cooter's model, tastes and preferences do not change, but actions
may change when individuals think that other individuals will begin
enforcing norms. The state can cause the model to tip toward a new
equilibrium. However, state action that supports a norm may actually
make people feel more strongly about the norm, or more guilty if they
violate it. If this is the case-if law is a teacher about what is right and
wrong-then the care with which law is applied to support some
47 See sources cited supra note 23. See also Robert A. Pollak, Endogenous Tastes in Demand and Welfare Analysis, 68 AM. ECON. REv. 374 (1978) (arguing that the malleability of
tasks suggests that people come to want what they get, rather than get what they want);
Sunstein, supra note 19 (identifying when and why lawmakers should reject private preferences as a basis for social choice).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:980

norms or disregard others has importance beyond the simple consideration of law's tipping ability.
As an example, allow me to put this in the context of two of Professor Cooter's examples. 4 8 Let us suppose that, as a result of the
state's policy announcement, there is less smoking in public places
and more people employing pooper scoopers. Has the state helped
us to a more efficient level of public smoking and poop scooping? Or,
has it created a new set of preferences under which the new outcome
appears to be efficient (and, technically is efficient-though not for
any reason that would appear to have any solid moral backing)?
G. A Policymaker's Reaction
My final thoughts deal with the pubic-private intersection and
how it is affected by the phenomena Professor Cooter has suggested.
As I understand it, the policy that flows from Professor Cooter's ideas
would more or less boost efficient norms that might be having difficulty making it over the hump and would raise the costs of the formation of harmful norms. Further, the premise is that efficient norms
are beneficial and inefficient ones are harmful.
There are some obvious problems with this. It is not at all clear
that efficiency is always a good thing. We need not go down that path
since the question has entire books and journals devoted to it. 49 In

fact, one clearly inefficient happening is the number of resources devoted to the discussion of when efficiency (in any of its many forms)
qualifies as something beneficial. That, oddly enough, may be the
easier part.
The more difficult problem is determining which social norms
are efficient and which ones are not. Without going through my prior
discussion about social norms actually being about distributive matters, and the highly contingent nature of efficiency, a few final
thoughts bear mentioning. Obviously, efficiency in any particular
context is dynamic. Thus, even if we could agree on everything else,
we would have problems determining when to act in a manner that
promotes efficiency. The norm we see today may just be the remnants
of a norm that was efficient a generation ago, that now has simply
become a custom. Similarly, norms that make great sense today may
make little sense in the future. If anything, inertia in public policy is
greater than that in the private markets. Thus, the state is not very
adaptable to whatever efficiency means at any particular time.
48 Cooter, Normative Failure,supra note 1, at 976-77.
49 See, e.g., RicHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMCS OFJUSTIcE (1981) (discussing the relationship between justice and efficiency); Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth
Maximization, 8 HoFmRA L. Rxv. 509 (1980); Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980).
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I am further concerned by one final aspect of the proposition
that the state should enforce beneficial social norms, when related to
efficiency. When I think of the state from a public choice perspective,
I think of it, at least in a simplistic way, as providing a market that is
counter to traditional markets. It is a market in which money speaks
very loudly, but it is also a market that allows appropriators to have a
say. That is, one person's vote says as much as another's. There is a
possibility that the wealth of this market in the form of collective
votes, for better or worse, is allocated relatively evenly. Thus, in this
market, those who might otherwise be labeled appropriators are given
a say. These individuals could be the blacks sitting at a lunch counter
in Greensboro, North Carolina in the 1960s, the strikers in the 1920s,
or even Rosa Parks-all of whom acted quite inefficiently and certainly out of sync with the social norm. Certainly, businesses could
make a good argument that these kinds of activity are inconsistent
with wealth or utility maximization.
This suggests that the state's following social norms amounts to a
bit of double dipping-efficiency drives norms and ultimately, public
policy as well. I think it is more comforting to think of the state as
being more wary of social norms, especially when they are being promoted by identifiable groups that stand to gain by labelling those
norms as "efficient" and "good for the nation."

